Abstract. Unbalanced Feistel schemes with expanding functions are used to construct pseudo-random permutations from kn bits to kn bits by using random functions from n bits to (k − 1)n bits. At each round, all the bits except n bits are changed by using a function that depends only on these n bits. C.S.Jutla [6] investigated such schemes, which he denotes by F d k , where d is the number of rounds. In this paper, we describe novel Known Plaintext Attacks (KPA) and Non Adaptive Chosen Plaintext Attacks (CPA-1) against these schemes. With these attacks we will often be able to improve the result of C.S.Jutla. We also give precise formulas for the complexity of our attacks in d, k and n.
Introduction
A Feistel scheme from {0, 1} l to {0, 1} l with d rounds is a permutation built from rounds functions f 1 , . . . , f d . When these round functions are randomly chosen, we obtain what is called a "Random Feistel Scheme". The attacks on these "random Feistel schemes" are called "generic attacks" since these attacks are valid for most of the round functions f 1 , . . . f d .
• When l = 2n and when the f i functions are from {0, 1} n to {0, 1} n we obtain the most classical Feistel schemes, also called "balanced" Feistel schemes. Since the famous paper of M.Luby and C.Rackoff [11] , many results have been obtained on the security of such classical Feistel schemes (see [12] for an overview of these results). When the number of rounds is lower than 5, we know attacks with less than 2 l (= 2 2n ) operations: for 5 rounds, an attack in O(2 n ) operations is given in [15] and for 3 or 4 rounds an attack in √ 2 n is given in [1] , [13] . When the functions are permutations, similar attacks for 5 rounds are given in [7] and [9] . Therefore, for security, at least 6 rounds are recommended, i.e. each bit will be changed at least 3 times.
• When N = kn and when the round functions are from (k −1)n bits to n bits, we obtain what is called an "Unbalanced Feistel Scheme with contracting functions". In [12] some security proofs are given for such schemes when for the first and the last rounds pairwise independent functions are used instead of random contracting functions. At Asiacrypt 2006 ( [16] ) generic attacks on such schemes have been studied.
• When N = kn and when the rounds functions are from n bits to (k−1)n bits, we obtain what is called an "Unbalanced Feistel Scheme with expanding functions", also called "complete target heavy unbalanced Feistel networks"(see [17] ). Generic attacks on Unbalanced Feistel Schemes with expanding functions is the theme of this paper. One advantage of these schemes is that it requires much less memory to store a random function of n bits to (k − 1)n bits than a random function of (k −1)n bits to n bits. BEAR and LION [2] are two block ciphers which employ both expanding and contracting unbalanced Feistel networks. The AES-candidate MARS is also using a similar structure.
Attacks on Unbalanced Feistel Schemes with expanding functions have been previously studied by C.S.Jutla ( [6] ). We will often be able to improve his attacks by attacking more rounds, or by using a smaller complexity. Moreover we will generalize these attacks by analyzing KPA (Known Plaintext Attacks), not only CPA-1 (non adaptive plaintext attacks) and by giving explicit formulas for the complexities. We will not introduce adaptive attacks, or chosen plaintext and chosen ciphertext attacks, since we have not found anything significantly better than CPA-1.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we give some notation. Then, we describe our different attacks when k = 3. For the clarity of the exposition we have decided to present in the main part of this paper only the case k = 3, only the best known attacks, and only when the complexity is less then O(2 N ) = O(2 kn ) = O(2 3n ) when k = 3. The attacks with a complexity greater than or equal to O (2 3n ) and k = 3 will be presented in Appendices A, B,C and D. Finally, the attacks for any k, k ≥ 3 will be presented in Appendices E,F,G,H, I. Our attacks for any k ≥ 3 are in fact a generalisation of our attacks for k = 3. We will have essentially two families of attacks called "2 point attacks" (TWO) and "rectangle attacks" (SQUARE, R1, R2, R3, R4). It can be noticed that k = 2 is very different from k = 3 (and k ≥ 3), since we do not have the analog of the "rectangle" attacks.
Notations
We first describe Unbalanced Feistel Scheme with Expanding Functions F d k and introduce some useful notations. F d k is a Feistel scheme of d rounds. At each round j, we denote by f j the round function from n bits to (k − 1)n bits. f j is defined as f j = (f
by going through d rounds. At round j, the first n bits of the round entry are used as an input to the round function f j , which produces (k − 1)n bits. Those bits are xored to the (k − 1)n last bits of the round entry and the result is rotated by n bits.
The first round is represented on Figure 1 below:
We introduce notation X j : we denote by X j the n-bit value produced by round j, which will be the input of next round function f j+1 . We have
. . .
More generally, we can express the X j recursively:
can be expressed by using the introduced values X j :
More generally, we can express the S j recursively:
We have σ • σ =Identity and (F
1 )) • σ. Therefore by composition, we see that the inverse of an F d k is another F d k if we take the k inputs, the k outputs and the d(k − 1) functions in the inverse order:
1 ) • σ 3 Attacks "TWO" with k = 3 and d ≤ 5
In this section, we will describe a family of attacks called "TWO". These attacks will use correlations on pairs of cleartext/ciphertexts. Therefore, they can be called "2 points" attacks. When k = 2 (i.e. on classical balanced Feistel Schemes) these attacks give the best known generic attacks (cf [15] ). However these attacks where have not been studied in [6] . As we will see, TWO attacks are more efficient than the attacks of [6] when the number of rounds is very small, or very large but, surprisingly, not when the number of rounds is intermediate.
Remark. We present here TWO only for k = 3 and d ≤ 5. TWO for k = 3 and d ≥ 6 will be presented in Appendix A and TWO for any k ≥ 3 will be presented in Appendix E. 
. The idea of the attack is to count the number N of indices (i 1 , i 2 , i 3 , i 4 ) such that:
We will call the 4 first equations the "input equations", and we will call the 5 last equations the "output equations".
KPA.
If the messages are randomly chosen we will have E(N )
6 (X 5 ) and
6 (X 5 ), we get the 5 output equations written above. Therefore, in KPA, for a F 6 3 permutation, the expectancy of N is larger than for a random permutation by a value about . So we will be able to distinguish with a high probability F Let α be a fixed integer between 0 and n (the best value for α will be chosen below). We will generate all the possible messages [I 2·2 5n , i.e. about 2 times more solutions, since these 5 output equations can occur at random, or due to 5 internal equations in X, as we have seen. So this CPA-1 will succed with a high probability when N = 0 with a high probability i.e. when m ≥ O(2 
Complexity
Here the complexity is in O(m) because we can compute N in O(m). For this we can proceed in 3 steps.
Step 1: we compute all the solutions (i, j) such that S , and unlike the TWO attacks of the previous sections can be seen as using only ideas already present in Jutla's paper [6] (except the fact that we have also designed a KPA, not only a CPA-1).
5 Attack "R1" on F 7 3 We will now describe our "R1" attack on F . As we will see, we will obtain here a complexity in O(2 2n ) in CPA-1 and in O( 2 5n 2 ) in KPA. This is better than the O(2 3n ) of the TWO attacks. In [6] , Jutla shows that he can obtain on F d k attacks with complexity less than O(2 kn ) when d ≤ 3k − 3. For d = 3, this gives attacks up to only 6 rounds, unlike here where we will reach 7 rounds with a complexity less than 2 3n . We have
be six indices of messages (so these values are between 1 and m). We will denote by [
e. for simplicity we use the notation I 1 (α) and
The idea of the attack is to count the number N of indices (i 1 , i 2 , i 3 , i 4 , i 5 , i 6 ) such that:
We will call the 7 first equations the "input equations" and we will call the 8 last equations the "output equations". KPA. If the messages are randomly chosen, for a random permutation we will have E(N ) m 6 2 15n . (The standard deviation σ can also be computed, cf Appendix D, however the standard deviation is not needed here since E(N ) will be about the double for F 3 ). For a F 7 3 permutation we will have about 2 times more solutions since the 8 output equations can occur at random, or due to these 8 internal equations:
Therefore here we have: ϕ = 6, a = 2, n I = 7, n S = 8, n X = 8, where ϕ denotes the number of points linked with the equalitites, a denotes the number of equations in X between the indices 1 and 3, n I denotes the number of input equations, n S the number of output equations and n X the number of needed equations in X.
These equations are summarized in figure 3 below.
In this figure 3 (as in figure 2 ), two points are joined by an edge if the values are equal (for example I 1 (1) = I 1 (2)). We draw a solid edge if the probability appears with probability 1 2 n and a dotted line if the equality follows conditionally with probability 1 from other imposed equalities. For example here, from
4) = 0 and in the same way
7 (X 6 ) and
7 (X 6 ), we get the 8 output equations written above. Therefore, in KPA, for a F 7 3 permutation, the expectancy of N is larger than for a random permutation by a value of about m 6 2 15n (since we have 8 equations in X and 7 in I), i.e. we expect to have about 2 times more solutions for N :
. So we will be able to distinguish with a high probability F 7 3 from a random permutation by counting N when N = 0 with a high probability, i.e. when m 6 Attack "R2" on F 8 3 We will present here our best attack on F 8 3 . These attacks belong to a family of attacks that we have called "R2". In fact, R2 attacks are very similar to M1 attacks: the main difference is the position of the equations in I. (A more general description and analysis of the R2 attacks will be given in Appendix H). Therefore we present here only the main ideas (our notations and conventions for R2 are similar to those for M1). The ideas of the attack R2 on F 
We will call the 12 first equations the "input equations" and we will call the last 11 equations the "output equations. In the same way as we did for M1 on F , we can easily prove that the expectancy for N is about double in F 8 3 compared with a random permutation, since in F 8 3 the 11 output equations can occur at random or due to these 11 equations in X:
8 (S 3 )). Therefore here we have: ϕ = 8, a = 2, n I = 12, n S = 11, n X = 11, with the usual notations for ϕ, a, n I , n S , n X . These equations are summarized in figure 4 below. KPA If the messages are randomly chosen we will have E(N )
permutations. Therefore with a good probability N = 0 (and the attack will succeed) when m ≥ O(2 (each collision in I 1 has probability about 1 √ 2 n ) for a random permutation and E(N )
2 ) so the probability of success is not negligible.
.5n in CPA-1). These conditions are also satisfied here.
Experimental results
We have implemented the CPA-1 attacks SQUARE and R1 against F Our experiments show that the distinguisher on F 6 3 is more efficient than the one on F . But in both case they confirm our theoretical analysis. n , SQUARE 2 5 3 n , SQUARE n , R1, ϕ = 6 2 2n , R1, ϕ = 6
Open problems
There are still many open problems on Unbalanced Feistel Schemes with Expanding Functions.
• One of them is to get proofs of security, not only design of attacks. Classical proofs "a la Luby-Rackoff" will give security within the "birthday bound" (i.e. in m << √ 2 n ). A better proof is given in [6] with security in m ≤ 2
It is probably possible to improve this result (for example by using generalisation of [15] ) in order to get security in m << 2 n ("information theory bound"). However here 2 n is very small compared with a security in, say, 2 nk that we would like to get. At present, proving a security in 2 αn , for α > 1 looks a very difficult problem, not mentioning α = k or α > k.
• Another problem is to design better attacks than the attacks of this paper. For example, instead of 2 points attacks (TWO) or rectangle attacks (M1, R2), we have tried attacks with different geometries of the equations (hexagons instead of rectangles, 3-dimension cubes instead of 2-dimension rectangles, etc...). So far our most promising new geometries are "Multi-Rectangles attacks" (see Appendix J). These new attacks are very promising (at least from a theoretical point of view) but still under investigation.
Conclusion
The attacks of this paper improve C.S.Jutla's results [6] . We follow many C.S.Jutla's ideas: we employ generalizations of the birthday paradox, and we use in our attacks SQUARE, R1, R2, R3, R4 a"rectangle framework" of equalities. Usual birthday attacks (see [1] , [10] , [3] ) are based on requiring two variables to be the same. Generalizations to more than one coincidence have been studied in [5] , [4] , [8] .
To improve the attacks of C.S.Jutla, we have first made a systematic analysis of the different ways to optimize the parameters. For example, we have optimized the position of the internal equalities and of the equalities in the input and the ouput variables in the rectangle framework and we have computed the optimal number of points of this rectangle framework. In CPA-1, we have also introduced a fixed number of 0 at the beginning of I 2 , I 3 , . . . , I k . We have described 5 general attacks TWO, M1, R2, R3, R4 and the best of these 5 attacks is sometimes TWO, sometimes M1, sometimes R2, or R3, or R4 depending on the number of rounds (cf Appendix I).
One of our main result is that we can attack with KPA with a complexity strictly lower than 2 kn when d ≤ 3k − 1 (unlike d ≤ 3k − 3 with CPA-1 for C.S.Jutla). Therefore we have obtained "generic attacks" (with a complexity less than 2 kn ) on two more rounds by using rectangle attacks. Another of our result is that when k and d are fixed the complexity of our attacks are generally smaller than [6] . Another of our main result is the fact that we have shown that the "TWO" attacks are the best known attacks for very Moreover, we have shown that there exists also another very promising family of attacks, that we have called "MultiRectangle" attacks. We think that with "Multi-Rectangle" attacks we will be able to attack more rounds (when k ≥ 4) and decrease the complexity, but the precise results are not exactly known since these attacks are still under investigation.
In conclusion, there are much more possibilities for generic attacks on unbalanced Feistel schemes with expanding functions than with other Feistel schemes (classical or with contracting functions). So these constructions must be designed with great care and with sufficiently many rounds. However, if sufficiently many rounds are used, these schemes are very interesting since the memory needed to store the functions is much smaller compared with other generic Feistel schemes.
Appendices A,B,C,D for k = 3
A Attacks TWO with k = 3 and d ≥ 6
A.1 Attack TWO against F 6 3 In this sub-section we will describe the "MO" attack on F 6 3 . Unlike for 1,2,3,4,5 rounds, this attack is not the best attack that we have found against F 6 3 . However, it is interesting to describe it in order to compare it with the other attacks.
KPA Attack
We will concentrate the attack on the equation:
In this attack, we will count the number N of (i, j), i < j such that
For a random permutation, the expectancy of N is E(N )
(The way to compute the standard deviation is explained in Appendix D). For F 6 3 , we can notice that when I 1 (i) = I 1 (j) and I 2 (i) = I 2 (j), we have
and this can occur if
(with a probability about (with a probability about 
CPA-1 Attack
We can transform this attack in a CPA-1 attack with a better complexity. Let µ be an integer (µ will be chosen below about 2 n ). We will choose µ possible values for (I 1 , I 2 ) and we will ask for the 2 n · µ ciphertexts of (I 1 , I 2 , I
3 ) for all possible I 3 . We will count the number N of (i, j) such that:
For a random permutation the expectancy of
The way to compute the standard deviation is explained in Appendix D). For F 6 3 , E(N ) is slightly larger, as we have seen above: we expect to have about µ · 2 2n 2 2n more solutions, i.e. about µ more solutions. This is larger than σ(N ) when µ ≥ √ µ · 2 n , i.e. when µ ≥ 2 n . Thus we have obtained a CPA-1 on
Remark: On F 6 3 if we start from equation S 1 instead of S 3 , we will obtain a similar KPA but we will obtain a chosen ciphertext attack in 2 2n instead of a chosen plaintext attack. This is why we have presented here the attacks from the equation S 3 .
A.2 Attack TWO against F 7 3
We present here only the main ideas, since the attack is similar as before. We can concentrate the attack on the equation of S 2 (or with S 1 , since with S 1 , we have a similar result).
We will count the number N of (i, j), i < j, such that:
For a random permutation, we have E(N )
3 , we will have about m 2 2·2 5n more solutions (they came from X 3 (i) = X 3 (j) and X 4 (i) = X 4 (j)). Therefore this attack will succeed when
). This gives a KPA with complexity about 2 3n and about 2 3n messages. (We have here nothing better in CPA-1).
A.3 Attack TWO against
Here we will assume that we want to attack not only one F d 3 but a generator of F d 3 permutations, i.e. we have access to α such permutations with µ messages per permutation (µ will be about 2 3n ). In this TWO attack, (here d = 2 mod 3), we will count the number N of (i, j), i < j such that:
For α random permuations we have E(N )
with a standard deviation σ(N ) = O( αµ 2 2 5n ). (The way to compute the standard deviation is explained in Appendix D).
•
Therefore for F 8 3 we will have about αµ 2 2 6n more solutions in N (they come from X 3 (i) = X 3 (j) and X 4 (i) = X 4 (j)). This is larger than σ(N ) (and the attack will succeed) if • F . This is larger than σ(N ) if
)n ). Therefore we have obtained a KPA against a generator of F )n ). Since d = 2 mod 3, this is also O(2
A.4 Attack TWO against F d 3 when d ≥ 9 and d = 0 mod 3 Here we will again assume that we have access to α permutations with µ messages per permutation, µ 2 3n . When d = 0 mod 3, we will count the number N of (i, j), i < j such that:
For α random permutations, we have E(N )
with a standard deviation σ(N ) = O(
more solutions in N (by writing the expression of S 3 similarly as before). This is larger than Here we will again assume that we have access to α permutations with µ messages per permutations, µ 2 3n . When d = 1 mod 3, we will count the number N of (i, j), i < j such that:
(Remark: another possible attack with the same complexity will be to count the number N of (i, j), i < j such that:
For α random permutations we have E(N )
with a standard deviation σ(N ) = O( 
)n ). Therefore we have obtained a KPA against a generator of F We summarize the results obtained in this section on the TWO attacks in the table 1 below. These are the best attacks that we have found by using correlation on only two indices i and j. In the next section, we will study attacks by correlation on more than two indices. 
The horizontal line shows when the complexity reaches 2 3n , i.e. when we need a generator.
D Computation of the Standard deviations
In the attacks TWO, we have sometimes to compute the standard deviation σ(N ) of a variable N . We will explain here how these values σ(N ) can be computed. In TWO we will have σ(N ) E(N ) but this is not always true in M1, R2, R3, R4. σ(N ) can be computed in the same way for SQUARE, R1, R2, R3, R4, but we do not need it, as explained above. We will compute σ(N ) as explained in [16] . The starting point of the computation is to use this classical formula on the covariances: If x i are variables (independent or not), we have:
Where cov(x i , x j ) is the covariance of x i and x j :
We will present here just one example of explicit computations of σ(N ) from this formula (1) . All the other cases lead to similar computations. Example: Computation of σ(N ) for F 6 3 Here we choose µ values for (I 1 , I
2 ), for example we can assume that I 1 is constant, and that we have µ distinct values for I 2 . Since I 1 is constant, we want to count the number N of (i, j) such that
The way to compute E(N ) and σ(N ) in such cases was explained in [16] p. 410-411. We give here only some details for F 6 3 . Let E be the set of all possible (i, j), i = j, such that I
is constant and we have 2 n possibilities for
We have:
where B 3n is the set of all permutations from 3n bits to 3n bits. For a random function, we have E(
and I 3 (i) = I 3 (j) we can prove that the exact value here is E(δ ij ) =
Case 1: i, j, k, l are 4 distinct values. Then the computation shows that
Case 2: In {i, j, k, l} we have 3 values. Then the computation shows that
Therefore, from ( * ) we have:
Appendices E,F,G,H,I for k ≥ 3 E Attacks "TWO" for any k ≥ 3
In this section, we explain the attack TWO. This attack does not use a rectangle but multiple collisions on 2 points (except for F 1 k ) and is interesting for a small number of rounds or when we are attacking generators.
We need one message in KPA and CPA-1. We just test if
For the CPA-1 attack, we have m = 2. We choose two messages such that I 1 is constant. Then we test if S k ⊕ I 2 is constant. With a random permutation, the probability is 1 2 n and with F 2 k the probability is 1. We transform this attack into a KPA attack. We count the number of (i, j) such that I 1 (i) = I 1 (j) and then we test if S k (i) ⊕ I 2 (i) = S k (j) ⊕ I 2 (j). If m ≥ 2 n 2 , we can get such collisions and then the attack succeeds.
For the CPA-1 attack, we have m = 2 messages again. We choose I 1 , I 2 , . . . , I d−1 constant. then X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X d−2 will be constant but the X d−1 values will be pairwise distinct and ∀i, j,
As before with a random permutation, the probability is We will concentrate the attack on the equation:
The attack proceeds as follows:
1. We choose I 1 , I 2 , . . . , I k−1 constant. Then we have that I 1 , X 1 , . . . , X k−2 are constant and that
and this implies that i = j ⇒ X k−1 (i) = X k−1 (j). 2. Then, we look for indexes i, j, i = j such that S k (i) = S k (j). (Here we notice that S k = X k since d = k + 1). Then
k+1 (S k )). When m √ 2 n , we can find such collisions and distinguish a random permutation from F k+1 k and the complexity is about √ 2 n . As previously, we transform this attack into a KPA attack. We need to have k − 1 equalities on the variables I i , 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 and one equality on S k−1 . So, this attack is possible if m ≥ 2 kn 2 with the same complexity.
E.5 Attack TWO against F k+2 k
1. We choose I 1 , I 2 , . . . , I k−1 constant. Then we have that I 1 , X 1 , . . . , X k−2 are constant and that ∀i, j, X k−1 (i) ⊕ X k−1 (j) = I k (i) ⊕ I k (j) and this implies that i = j ⇒ X k−1 (i) = X k−1 (j). 2. Then we look for indexes i, j such that S k (i) = S k (j) and S k−1 (i) = S k−1 (j). Here, we have the following relations:
So the X k−1 are pairwise distinct but we can get a collision (i, j) for the X k+1 variables and the X k variables. Then we test if
So when m 2 ≥ 2 2n i.e. m ≥ 2 n , we can get such collisions and the attack follows. We notice that this attack is possible since we have the condition m ≤ 2 n (only the variables I k can take all the possible values). This attack leads to a KPA attack with m 2 ≥ 2 (k+1)n . This gives m ≥ 2 
